

サイ。レーンボウ第一號ノ日附何時トナツテイマスカ

デエロー大將 レーンボウ第一號ハ八月十四日海軍長官代理ニヨリ承認セ  
シタモノデス。

副議長 八月十四日トハ何年ノデスカ

デエロー大將 一九三九年、昭和十四年、です。一九三九年、昭和十四年、  
八月十四日陸軍長官代理ニヨツテデス。此書類(二六四二)ハ私ガ戦争計畫  
部ニ配属セラル前ニ出来テ居リマシタ。

ハサウェル氏 ソレハ分ツテオリマシタ。戦争計畫部一員トシテノ貴方ニ求  
ム事ハ其ノ計畫案ハ何チショウトシタモノカ、又ソレト一九三八年、  
昭和十三年ノオランデトノ關係ハドウデアツタカニツイテ本委員會ニタ  
接洽的ニオ話シテ下サルコトデセウ。

エロー大將 ハイ

計畫ノ根據トスル一般的狀勢ハ此ノ指令ガ發セラレタ當時歐洲大戰ガ進行  
中デ、他ノ諸國ヲ引キ入レソノ爲軍事行動ノ舞台ヲ擴メル可能性ガアツタノ  
デアリマス。

合衆國ガ今直グニモ此戰爭ニ引キズリ込マレル可能性ガ絶エズ存在シテ居ル。又歐洲ノ平和ハ、合衆國ガモンロー主義ト太平洋ニ於ケル我ガ権益保全ノ爲メニ聯合國トハ離レテ防禦シケレバナラクナルダラウトイフ状勢ヲ伴フ可能性ガアル。

ミツチエル氏 其ノ計畫案ハ大西洋及太平洋ノ作戰行動ニモ亘ツテ居リマスカ

デエロー大將 ハイ ソウデアリマス

ミツチエル氏 同案ハ萬一ノ對日戰ヲモ假想シテ居マスカ  
デエロー大將 ハイ ソウデアリマス。私ハ其ノ根據トツル特別狀勢ニ就テ朗讀致シタイト存ジマス。

二六四三、ミヂエル氏 ヨロシイ

デエロー大將 レーンボウ第一號ニ關スル特別情勢ハ一朗讀

歐羅巴ニ於ル戰爭ノ終結ニ續イテ獨逸及伊太利ニヨリ南亞米利加ニ於テ  
モンロー主義ノ條文又ハ精神ガ冒演サレテイル。コレニ加フルニ極東ニ  
於ケル合衆國ノ権益ニ對シ日本ノ武力侵略ガ行ハレテイル。其他ノ諸國

ハ中立デアル。

本策ノ目的ハ敵ノ目的特ニ西半球ノ凡ソ南緯十三度以北ノ領土及水域上  
ノ敵目的ヲ打チ破ルガ爲メ海陸軍兵力ヲ最モ效果的ニ使用スル様準備ス  
ルニアツタ。本計畫ハ先づ最初ニ合衆國兵力ノ行使ヲ米兩大陸ト  
↓南緯十三度以北ノ大陸周邊ノ諸島並ニウラスカ反ミツドウェーを  
合ふ西太平洋ニ於ケル合衆國領土ニ限ル。本計畫ハ其後ノ西太平洋ニ對  
スル合衆國支配權ノ擴大ハ西半球ニ於ル合衆國ノ軍事目的の完成ト相俟ツ  
テ出來ル丈ケ急速ニ具体化スル、然シ乍クスル作戰行動ノ擴大ノ如キ計  
畫ハ目下出來テ居ナイ。

ミンチエル氏 デハ共同陸海軍基本戦争計畫中ノ第三ノ項目レーンボウ  
第五號ニ達ンデ下サイ。先ズ（二六四四）御覽ニナツテソノ日附トソノ  
案ノ範囲ハ正確ニドンナモノデアルカ或ハ又ドンナモノデアツタカヲ簡  
潔に語シテ下サイ。

デニロ！大將、此ノ計畫ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月十九日參  
謀總長ト海軍作戰部長ニヨツテ承認セラレマシタ。  
私ハ本案ノ其ノ基礎トナツテ居ル一般的假説ヲ朗讀スレバ本案ノ如何ナ  
ルモノデアルカハ一番ヨク解ルト思ヒマス、即チ

當初合衆國、英國聯邦（エールフ、除ク）支那及自由佛蘭西（ヨリ  
成ル聯合國ハ

イ、獨逸、伊太利、ルーマニヤ、ハンガリー、ブルガリヤ、或ハ  
ロ、獨逸、伊太利、日本、ルーマニヤ、ハンガリー、ブルガリヤ

印度支那、泰國

ヨリ威ル権輿諸國ト交戦中ナルコト。

聯合國ハ▲30-1及▲30-1ニニ隨ヒ戰ヲ行フコト。

假今日本、印度支那及泰國ハ當初戰爭ニ加ハラザリシニモセヨ、之等諸國介入ノ可能性ヲ考慮ニ入レザルベカラザルコト。

極東ヲ根據トスベキ合衆國軍ハ人員彈薬、技術的原料以外ノ軍事上ノ必用品ハソノ總地區ニ於ケル資源ヨリ充當シ得フルベキコト。

拉丁アメリカ共和國諸國ハ（二六四五）破壞的分子取締ノ手段ヲ講メルヨト、但シ直接攻擊ヲ受ルニ至ルニ非レバ非交戰國狀態ヲ存續スルコト、大体ニ於テ是等共和國諸國領海及國土ノ根據地ハ半球防衛ノ目的ヲ以テ合衆國軍ノ使用ニ供セラルベキコト。

以上ハ本計畫案ノ準據セル假説ニアリマス。

ミンチエル氏、デハ次ノ項目、陸軍省作戦計畫案一レーンボウ第五騎ニ移リマセウ。アレハ何デスカ。

デエロー大將、陸海軍共同基本戰爭計畫案ガ出來マシテカラ陸軍ト海軍トハ共同計畫ヲ基礎トシテ各自別々夫々ノ計畫ヲ建テマシタ。

此ノ昭和十六年ノ陸軍省作戦計畫、レーンボウ第五師ハ陸海軍共同基本  
計畫一レーンボウ第 跡フ基トシテ摺ヘタ陸軍省案デアリマス。此ノ中  
ニハ基本計畫ノ中ニアルモノガ澤山アリマス。即ナ戰爭ノ概念、戰爭遂  
行ノ場合ノ諸假說、兵力配分ノ方法、下位指揮官ニ夫々從屬的計畫ヲ立  
案セシムル指令、政府内他ノ各省トノ間ニ保持セザルベカラザル統制ヲ  
含ムデ居リマス。

Def Doc 1500 K 4

ミツチエル氏「布陸諸島地域ハ其ノ範囲ノ中ニ含マレルノデセウカ」  
デエロー中將「ソウデス、含マレテオリマス」

(二六四六)

ミツチエル氏「貴官ハ其ノ日附ヲ申シマシタカ」

デエロー中將「此ノ書類ハ承認ノ日附カ晉イテアリマセン 然シ私ハ  
ソレハ確カニ一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月中ニアツタト思イマス」

ミツチエル氏「書證第四四號ニハ「一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月、  
參謀長ニ依リ承認サルト記入シテアリマス」

デエロー中將「成ル達ソウデス、私ノ書類ノ中ノ何處カニソノ控ヘガ  
アルト思ヒマス」

ミツチエル氏「心配シナイデヨロシイ 大体其ノ邊デシヨウ」

デエロー中將「其レハ確ニ一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月ニ布陸ニ同  
ケテ發送サレタモノデス、ソシテ其ノ受領書ハ一九四一年（昭和十

六年）九月三日ニ陸軍省カラ轉送サレテ受ケ取ツテオリマス」

ミツチエル氏「次ニ御聞キシタイ事ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）改正  
ノ布陸防衛計畫ニ關スル抜萃デス。貴官ハ其レヲ御覽ニナツテ其ノ  
書類ノ範囲ト保管、ソレカラ其ノ日附ヲ言ツテ下サイ」

デエロー中將「ハイ。此ノ書類ハ最初布陸ニ於イテ作製サレマシタ。  
唯今私ガ甲上ゲマシタ所ノ陸軍省案ニ基イテ作ツターツノ地方案デ  
アリマス」

ミツチエル氏「一九四〇年（昭和十五年）ニ地方勵務ノ司令官ニ依ツ  
テ作製サレタ一案デスカ？」

デエロー中將「ソウデアリマス」  
ミツチエル氏「布陸管轄區ノ司令將校ニ依ツテ作製サレタノデスカ」

（二六四七）

デエロー中將「布陸管轄區ノ司令將官ニ依ツテ作製サレタノデアリマ  
ス」

ミツチエル氏「ソレデハ、第十四海軍地區ノ司令官トイフ譯デスカ」

デエロー中將「違イマス。コレハ陸海共同案デハアリマセン。コレハ陸  
軍案デアリマス。コレハ案トハ少々違イマス。小官等ハソレヲ防衛構  
案ト呼ンデ居リマス」

ミツチエル氏「ワカリマシタ」

デエロー中將「ソレハ完遂スベキ一つノ目的ヲ含ンデ居リマス。ガ主トシ  
テ第一ニ相當ニ詳細ニ亘リ戰爭使命ヲ遂行スルタメ方法手段ヲ講ズル  
様ニ指令サレテ居リマス」

議長「一寸デエロー將軍ニオタヅ不シマス。貴官ハ、コレハ一九四〇  
年ニ作製サレ又唯今貴官ガ甲立テラレタバカリノ前項ニ基イテオルト  
言ワレルノデスガ前項ハ一九四一年（昭和十五年）八月ニ確認サレタ  
様ニ思ハレマス。コノ二ツノ年月ニ就イテハ何カ相違ガアルノデハナ  
イノデスカ」

デエロー中將「此ノ防衛構案ハ一年一回作製セラレ、ソシテ一年一回改  
正サレルノデアリマス。コレハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）一度版デアリ  
ンデシタガ、一九四一年（昭和十五年）一度版ハ其ノ當時ハまだ完成サレマセ  
マス。一九三八年度ノ、オレンジ案及ビレーションボ案第一號ニハ

布哇ノタメノ戰爭使命ガ含マレテ居リマシタ。ソシテ是等ノ計監案ハ其ノ當時存在セル防衛構造ヲ改正スペキ他ノ資料ト一所ニ採用サレタノデアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「其ノ次ニ御聞キシタイ事ハ布哇ノ共同海岸地區（二六四八）防衛計畫案デアリマスガ、其レハ何デスカ？」

デエロト中將「コレハ布哇陸軍及ビ海軍ノ地方司令官ニ依ツテ作製セラレタ共同計畫デ陸軍省ニ依ツテベエラレタ陸海軍共同計畫ニ基イタモノデアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「其ノ日附ハイツデスカ？」

デエロト中將「此ノ書類ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月十一日ニ布哇管轄區司令部ニ依ツテ承認セラレ且ツ一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月十一日ニ第十四海軍管區司令部ニ依ツテ承認サレタノデアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「其ノ書類ハ書證第四十四號中ニアリマシテ其ノ單ナル拔萃デハナクテ、全文デアルトイコトヲ私ハ申上ゲマス。全部

ガ此ノ書證第四十四號ノ中ニ收メラレテ居リマス。

次ノ事項ハ布陸ノ共同海岸地區防衛計畫案ノ附錄第七號中第七號デア  
リマス。ソシテ其ノ日附ハイツデスカ、ソシハ如何ナルモノデスカ」  
デエロー中將「其ノ質問ヲモウ一度繰り返シテ言ツテ下サイマセンカ」

ミツナエル氏「次ノ事項ハ布陸ノ共同海岸地區防衛計畫案ノ附錄第七號  
デアリマス。其ノ書類ハ如何ナルモノカ、ノ性質、及ビ其ノ日附ハ  
イツデスカ」

デエロー中將「附錄第七號ニ對シマシテハ第十四海軍管區司令部ト布陸  
管轄區司令部トニ依リ作製サレタツノ地方案ガ附イテオリマス。  
其ノ日附ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）三月二十八日デアリマス。ソシ  
テソレハ共同安全方策ト艦隊及び眞珠灣基地ノ保護トニ關スルモノデ  
アリマス。」

機密圖書證寫一五〇〇號 K-4

(二六四九一ミツチエル氏、同じく八月中ニアル次ノ事項ハ  
ハワイニ於ケル共同空軍隊算デアル

(マーテンベリンガー助定)。

ソレハ河レノ證據書デアリマスカ。

デセル氏 鳴四十四年元月ス。

ミツチエル氏 アナタハ「ハワイ一ニ於ケル空軍等勢ニ調ス  
ル研究」ト題スル一九四一年(昭和十六年)八月廿日付ノ報告テ凡  
タ基ガアリマシタカ。

チーフ氏 ソレハイツノヨリズスカ。

ミツチエル氏一九四一年(昭和十六年)八月廿日ズス、ソレ  
ハ「ハワイニ於ケル空軍情勢ノ研究」ト題シ、ハワイ州、シヤフ  
ター要塞、ハワイ部隊司令官ヲ通ジテ「ワシントン」、空軍司令  
官宛ニ送田サレタモノデ前ニ證據書證寫十三鏡ト記附サレタモノデ  
アリマス。アナタハ其證書ヲ曾テ見タ基ガアリマスカ。

デエロー中尉 真報告書テ見タテ今思ヒ想ス學ガ出來マゼン。

ミツテエル氏 航空母艦ガソレニ燃スルモノカラ攻撃サレサウナ時節  
チ朝ノ空中攻撃ニ對スル「ハワイ」ノ脆弱性ヲ考慮シ、次ニソレヲ破滅  
スル

方略及ビ前夜ノ中に日本航空母艦テ發見スル編メ三百六十時暴軍備  
察テ行フニ乗スル飛行機數ヲ計算シタ報告書デアリマス。

エロー中尉 私ハ此查聞會ノ直前に其舊領テ國ミマシタ。  
（二六五〇）ミツテエル氏 アナタハ其當時ハ御邊ニナシナカツタノ  
デスカ。

ニロー中尉 真當時見タ事テ忍て起シマセン

ミツテエル氏 日暮中ノ等九時ケズノ間日ハ「一九四一三月廿  
六年十一月五日附ハワイ部常時作業順序」ブアリマス  
ソレヲ御邊ニアツテソレハ何デアルカチ私共ニ説明シテ下サイマセんカ  
ニロー中尉 真當時ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）ハワイ部常時作業命  
令ノ中ニアルモノズス、サキニ述ベラレタヨウニソレハ一ツノ常時作業

順序デアリマス。

ミツテエル氏 誰ニヨツテ布告セラレタモノジスカ。

エロー中尉 ソレハ布呂部即司令官ニヨツテデアリマス。

ミツテエル氏 司令官自身ノ考ニニヨルモノジ、ワシントンカラノ指

命ヲハナカツタノズスネ。

エロー中尉 ソウデス、司令官自身ノモノズス

ミツテエル氏 ソレハシヨート軍下將ガ空襲回避第一艦ニ艦三チ指

命シタ旨減アリマスカ。ソレトセコノ結果ハ私ノ考ニ遠イデヤウカ。

エロー中尉 ソウデス、ソレモノ警戒ガ此ノ警報ニ企マレケオリマ

ス。 ミツテエル氏 言葉一即チ外郎カラ警戒テ文ゲズシテ行ワレル作

せ事等ズスカ。

エロー中尉 ソウズス。

ミツテエル氏 ソノ書類テ一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月七日以前ニ見マシタカ。

エロー中尉 十二月七日以前ニ見タテ思ヒ出シマゼン。(二六五一)陸軍省記録ニヨレバソレハ一九四一年(昭和十七年)ノヨリズニ來タモノト思ヒマス。

ミツチエル氏 第十項目ハ「戰地命令第一號」テ第十一ハ「海軍基本略語カラノ抜萃」第十二ハ「太平洋艦隊極秘文書二〇L」ノ

四一」ニアリマス。  
ソレ等ハ海軍ノ書類ニアリ、ターナー海軍大將ノ方ガ更ニ充分ニ説明出來ルノテアリマスガ、此處テノ陳述ヲ完結スル爲ニソレヲ御覽ニナツタ上大謹ドンナ性質ノモノカ説明シテ下サイマセんカ。

デエロー中將 ソレハ第十項目ニアリマスカ。

ミツチエル氏 第十、第十一、第十二テス。第十ガ先ヅ第一テ即チ「ハワイ部隊戰地命令第一號 N、S (海軍防衛一デス。ソノ日オヲ言ツテドサイ而シテ御覽ニナツテ分見ナラソノ大謹ノ性質ヲ話シテ下サイ。

ジエロー中將 第十、即チ戰地命令第一號 (海軍防衛一ハ陸軍ノ書類ニアリマス。

ミツチエル氏 ソウデスカ

ジエロー中將ソウデヌ。而シテソレハハワイ部隊司令官ニ依ツ  
テ發表サレタ作戦命令ニアリマス。ソレユハ日附ガアリマセん。  
ソレハ緊急ノ場合ニ施スペキ命令トシテ出タモノデス。

ミツチエル氏 第十一ハ何デスカ第十一第十二第十三 海軍ノ

書類デスカ

デエロー中將 第十一ハ此文書ガ示スヤウニ (二六五二) 「虹」  
第五號ラ基碇トシタ海軍ノ書類デアリマス。

ミツチエル氏 ソレハ「虹」第五號ニ對スル書類デ海軍ノ作戦計  
畫ニ相當スルモノデスカ ソレト類似ノモノデスカ

ジエロー中將 ソウデス。ソレハ陸、海軍共同基本計畫中ニアル  
命令ニ從ツテ作成サレタモノデアリマス

ミツチエル氏 次ノ項目ハ第十二即チ「太平洋艦隊極秘書類二一  
CL-四十一」改訂一即チ基地及ビ作戦區域ニ於ケル艦隊ノ防衛」  
デアリマス。ソレハイツノ日附デスカ

ジエロー中將 日附ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十四日デア  
リマス

ミツチエル氏 ソレハ誰ノ發令ニヨリ又誰ノ許可ニヨツタモノテ  
スカ

ジエロー中將 太平洋艦隊司令官ニヨツテ布告サレタ。ヲ其標題  
ガ示シテ居マス

ミツチエル氏 第十三ノ項目ハ第十四海軍區域海軍根據地防衛軍  
司令部作戰計畫第一一四一空あります。ソレハイツノ日テスカ  
又誰ノ發令又ハ誰ノ許可ニヨルモノデスカ。

ジエロー中將 ソレハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）二月七日附テ  
而シテソレハ眞珠灣第十四海軍區域海軍根據地防衛軍司令部ニヨツ  
テ發セラレタモノデス。

「眞珠灣攻擊」第三部一〇〇一頁一一〇〇七頁一

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, United States Army - Thursday, November 29, 1945.

• • • •  
Mr. GESELL. On the other hand, the estimates in exhibit 33 were prepared not for distribution to the theaters, but for the information of the General Staff?

General MILES. Chief of Staff and his General Staff; yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, what were your particular functions and duties in this organization, General Miles?

General MILES. I was the head of the whole organization, Military Intelligence Division, responsible for its administration, its expansion and for its output.

In other words, I spoke for the Military Intelligence of the General Staff. A paper would normally be prepared, we will say, of the Far East estimate by the far eastern section. That would then go for revision or comment to the immediate chief of the far eastern section, the head of the intelligence branch, and from that branch to me. But I am responsible for and was responsible for the output of the division.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, as head of the organization, of course, you had to give special emphasis to certain aspects of its activities, and I wondered whether there was any particular phase of the work of the Military Intelligence Division which (2074) you gave particular attention to.

General MILES. Normally I would say that my particular attention was devoted to our output in the way of analyzed and estimated, evaluated information which we called "Intelligence," but I also had a good many other irons in the fire.

Mr. GESELL. Now how were you organized within your division in respect to the handling of the far eastern information?

General MILES. The Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch was at that time under Colonel Bratton. He received all information that we obtained on the Far East from our military attaches, our observers, from the State Department, from the Navy Department, other departments of the Government, and although it was drying up considerably, information from civilian companies or press in the Far East, together, of course, with the secret information that we were getting from the intercepts - magic.

Mr. GESELL. Now to whom was he responsible?

General MILES. He was directly responsible to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, at that time Col. Hayes Kroner. There was, however, also within that branch a situation section under Lieutenant Colonel Betts, now brigadier general. That was in charge of information bearing on the situation in all parts of the world. I described it at that time as the heart (2075) of the Intelligence Branch. It maintained situation maps both for G-2 and for the Secretary of War. All special studies, and so forth, emanate from this particular section.

Mr. GESELL. And that section would work in close coordination, I gather from your statement, with the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch in the formulation of estimates and studies, is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, during that time you have indicated you had several sources of information. You mentioned attaches, you mentioned, I believe, the Japanese intercepts, which you referred to as "magic." What other sources were there?

General MILES. We had some observers in the field. We had a mission under General Magruder in China. We had, of course, the Intelligence Division in the staff of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments that were getting us information. We had started a nucleus of what might be called a secret service under Colonel Clear in Singapore. We had little money to give him, but at least he did make progress in tying in with the British Secret Service in the Far East. We exchange information, of course, with the Department of State and Navy Department particularly, and several other agencies, independent agencies of the Government in Washington, and with the military attaches and missions, particularly (2076) British, at that time in Washington.

Mr. GESELL. And I gather that all of these sources were sources of information which contributed data concerning the Far East?

General MILES. They did, sir.

RECEIVED  
AUG 1 1947

辯護文書一五〇〇一五

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會議事録

アメリカ合衆國第七十九國會第一議會

シャーマン。マイルス米國陸軍少將證言抜萃

一九四五年十一月二十九日木曜日

ゲセル氏

又他方書證第三十三號に於ける判断は作戦地域配布の目的  
を以つてではなく參謀本部の情報に資するため製作されたものでありますか

マイルス少將

その通り! 參謀総長及び參謀本部のために。

ゲセル氏

では此の組織に於ける貴下の特殊な職責と任務は何ですか

マイルス少將。

マイルス少將  
陸軍情報部全組織の長でありましてその管理、擴張及成果  
に就して責任を有しました。即ち私は參謀本部情報部を代  
表してゐたのであります。



ゲセル氏

極東情況判断の書類は通常極東科によつて作製されまし  
た。次いでそれは訂正又は批評を受けるため極東科の直  
接上官に、又情報課長に渡り、そこから私に回つて來る  
のでありました。然し情報の成果に對しては私が責任を  
有して居りますし又以前も有して居りました。

ではその組織の長として質下は當然組織の活動の特定の  
方面に重點を注がれた筈でありますか、果して質下が特  
別の注意を拂はれた陸軍情報部の活動の何等かの方面が  
あつたでせうか

マイルス少將  
ゲセル氏  
マイルス少將

通常私は吾々の所謂情報即ち分析判断評價された報導を  
提供することに私の重點を指向して居りました。が、そ  
の他にも中々多忙でした。

では極東情報を取り扱ふためには質下の情報部の<sup>中</sup>於て如  
何なる關係にありましたか  
情報課極東科は當時ブラットン大佐の指揮下にありまし

ゲセル氏

た。彼は吾が大使館付武官、視察者、海軍省他の省から吾  
吾が樺東に關して得た凡ての情報を受けた。又可  
成枯渴しつつありましが在樺東民間會社、新聞社からの情  
報並に當然傍受の匪術で得た情報を彼は受けたのであ  
ります。

ゲセル氏  
マイルス少將

では彼は誰に對して責任を有して居ましたか。

彼が直接責任を有してゐたのは情報課長に對してです。當  
時はヘイス。クローナ大佐が課長でありました。然し該課  
中には現在准將、當時のベット中佐指揮下の情勢科もありま  
した。該課は世界各地の情勢に關する情報の責を有しまし  
た。私は當時之を情報課の心臓と(二〇七五)と申してゐ  
ました。該課はG.I.C及び陸軍長官の兩者のために情勢圖  
を有していました。總ての特殊な研究の頃は此の特殊な課  
から提出されます。

貴下の證言より推察しますに、該課は情報課樺東科と情況

判斷及研究作製のため緊密な連携の下に活動して居りまし  
たか。

マイルス少將

ゲセル氏 所で、貴下はその期間に於いて若干の情報源を有しておら  
マイルス少將 れたことをお話しになりました。

貴下は大使館付武官を挙げられました。又、魔術と言はれ  
ました。日本關係の傍受電報のことも申されました。その  
他に何處から情報が入りましたか。

成地に若干の観察者がゐました。支那にはマーグルノダ一  
將軍指揮下の使節團があつて吾々に情報を提供してゐまし  
た。又勿論ハワイ、フィリッピン部隊の參謀部には情報部  
があつて情報を提供してゐました。シンガポールではクリ  
ア大佐以下の特務機關とも呼び得るもののは基礎を既に作つ  
てゐました。彼に與へるべき資金は殆んどありませんでした  
が、彼は少くとも極東に於ける英特務機關との携提を促

セル氏

進しました。吾々は勿論、特に國務省及海軍省と及その他の機關、在ワシントンにあつた陸軍武官、使節特に英國人の（二〇七六）と情報交換を致しました。

而して此等情報課が極東に關する材料を提供した情報源であつたと思ひますが

その通りであります。

Excerpts from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington, 1946)

Vol. II

Page 459

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Gesell. You were present, were you not, during the meeting in the Atlantic between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill?

Mr. Welles. I was.

Mr. Gesell. Did you receive any information at that meeting as to any agreement or arrangement or understanding that had been arrived at, if there was any, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning joint action of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific?

Mr. Welles. When I left the President, since he was due to return to Washington before myself, told me that he had had a conversation, or several conversations, with Mr. Churchill with regard to the Japanese situation and the increasing dangers in the Far East; that Mr. Churchill had suggested to him that the two governments, as a means which might be of some effect, should take parallel action in issuing a warning to the government of Japan.

As I recall it, the President stated that what Mr. Churchill had suggested was that the Government of the United States should state to the Government of Japan that if Japan persisted in her policy of conquest and aggression the United States, in the protection of its legitimate interests and in order to provide for its own security would have to take such acts as were necessary in its own judgment.

The President also asked me to tell Secretary Hull that he wished to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately upon his return and that warning which had been suggested as a parallel action by Mr. Churchill was communicated to the Japanese Ambassador by the President on August 17th of that year.

\* \* \* \*

Page 468

Mr. Murphy. There have been rumors throughout the country, in several of the papers, to the effect that at the Atlantic Conference, there was a promise by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of England, Mr. Churchill that we would stall the Japanese for a period--that is a free translation--stall the Japanese for a period of about 4 months.

Mr. Gearhart. Baby them.

Mr. Murphy. I am using the word "stall." My colleague suggests "baby them" along. At any rate, was there any promise, so far as you know, on the part of the President of the United States, or any commitment by him, to the Prime Minister of England, that we would stall, baby them along, or anything of that nature, for a period of 4 months?

Mr. Welles. The only promise made by the President, Mr. Congressman,

to the best of my knowledge and belief, is that I have already stated, namely that the United States would take parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government that we could not regard with indifference their continued expansion.

Mr. Murphy. And nothing else?

Mr. Welles. It was also the President's agreement, if it can be called that, an understanding was reached that the United States would again undertake the negotiations which, you remember, had been broken off when the Japanese moved into Indochina, would again undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government in an effort to avoid war.

• • • •

辯護側文書一五〇〇一K-16

眞珠灣攻撃抜萃 第二卷

四五九頁

前國務次官サムナー、ウエルズ 証言

ゲゼル氏、ルーズベルト大統領とチャーチル首相との太平洋會談中貴  
下は出席して居られましたか。

ウエルズ氏、して居りました。

ゲゼル氏、北米合衆國と英國とが太平洋で共同動作をとることに關しル  
ーズベルト大統領とチャーチル首相との間に到達した合意取極又は  
協定に付一若しありとすれば一同會談で何等かの情報をうけられまし  
たか。

ウエルズ氏、大統領は私よりも先にワシントンに歸ることになつて居り  
ましたので私が大統領と別れた時大統領は日本の状態並びに極東に於  
ける増加しつゝある危険についてチャーチル氏と會談をした事。チャ  
ーチル氏は大統領に英米兩國は何等かの效果を齎す手段として日本政



府に警告を發する事につき並行的措置をとるべきであると示唆しました。私の記憶によれば大統領はチャーチル氏が示唆した事は米國政府は日本政府に對し若しも日本が征服と侵略の政策も固執するならば米國はその合法的利益を保護する爲並にその安全を保持するためその必要と判断するが如き措置をとらなければならないと云ふことを表明すべきであるといふ事でした。

大統領は又歸つたり早速日本大使と會見を希望することをハル長官に告げるやうに私に希望致しました。

又チャーチル氏の示唆した並行的措置である警告は同年八月十七日大統領により日本大使に通知せられました。

マーフィー氏 太平洋會談の際米國大統領が英國首相チャーチル氏に對し  
米國は日本を暫くの間四ヶ月ばかり丸め込もうと一之はくだけた云ひ方  
ですが、約束をしたとの噂が國中に傳はり幾つかの新聞にも載せられま  
した。

ギャハート氏 赤ん坊の様にあやす

マーフィー氏 私は「丸め込む」と云ふ言葉を使つてゐますが私の同僚は  
「赤ん坊の様にあやす」と云ふ言葉を言つてゐます。ともかく貴下の御  
存知の限りでは米國大統領は英國首相に、米國は四ヶ月間日本を丸め込  
むとか赤ん坊のやうにあやすとか何かその様な性質の約束をしたことが  
ありますか。

ウエルズ氏 大統領のした約束は私の知り又信ずる所では私は既に述べた  
ことだけであります。即ち米國は日本が防牒を繼續する場合無關心では  
あり得ないと云ふことを日本政府に警告する事につき英國政府と並行的  
措置をとると云ふことでありました。

マーフィー氏 その他には何もありませんか。

ウエルズ氏 若しそう云へるならば次の事も大統領の約束でありました、即ち御承知の通り日本が印度支那に進駐してから交渉は中絶してゐたのですが、之を戦争を避けるため日本政府と再びしようとして云ふ諒解が成立したのです。

D. D. 1500-L-1

AT 2230 (LOCAL TIME) ON 18 JUNE, 1940, SENT THE FOLLOWING  
TO COMMANDANT, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT:

SECRET

"WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL AIR PATROL IS A PART  
OF ARMY EXERCISE OR IS IT BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE  
WAR DEPARTMENT".

AT 0945 (LOCAL TIME) ON 19 JUNE, 1940, THE FOLLOWING  
REPLY WAS RECEIVED:

CONFIDENTIAL

"REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL WAS BASED UPON A DIRECTIVE  
FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT X HE HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO  
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN EXERCISE"



-1-

機密文書類 一五〇〇一レ一

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）六月十八日二十二時（地方時間）左の如く  
ハワイ海軍空軍司令官へ打電した

機密

「ハワイ方面司令官の空中偵察を強化せよとの要求は軍演習の一部であるか又は米軍空軍よりの通告に基くものであるかを知りたし」  
一九四〇年（昭和十五年）六月十九日九時四十五分（地方時間）左の  
返電を受領した

機密

「司令官の要求は軍空軍からの指令に基く  
それが演習であるか否かに関する情報は得てゐない」



Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII  
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

- (3) 16 October 1941 from CNO to Kimmel et al. Subject: Japanese Cabinet Range.

(3) Drafter: Op-12.	Addressees	Priority
From: C N O.	For action	
Released by: Ingersol.	CINCLANT	
Date: October 16, 1941.	CINCPAC	
	CINCAF	
	(Acknowledge)	

162203 CR 0534

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX

Secret

(Page 1327 of Volume 14 "Pearl Harbor Attack" Series)



辯護御書類一五〇〇一L-12

第七十九米國議會第一會議

真珠灣攻撃合同調查委員會

書證第三十二號拔萃

書證第三十二號

自昭和十六年七月八日至九月七日陸軍省ハワイ間通信集

(三) 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月十六日海軍作戰部長より  
キムメル其他宛。題目。日本内閣の更迭。

(三) 起草者。OPI-12。

海軍作戰部長より。

發信者。インガソル。

日附。一九四一年十月十六日。

發送先、左ノ順ニヨリ

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

CINCAF

(要受領報告)



一六二二〇三 C.R.O五三四

日本内閣の辭職は事態を重大化した。新内閣が若し成立するとすればそれは甚だしく國家主義的且反米的のものにならう。

若し近衛内閣が留任するとしても結果に於ては同内閣は、米國と。妥協を含まざる新しき訓令の下に行動するであらう。

何れにせよ日、蘇間に戦争の可能性は極めて多い。

且又、日本は現下の自己の弱狀に對する責任を米國及英國に歸して居る爲日本は此等兩國を攻擊する可能性がある。かかる可能性に鑑み、貴下は戰略的意圖を漏洩せず、又、日本に對する挑戦的行爲とならざる範圍に於て準備行動を行ひ、その他然るべき警戒策を講ぜられたい。

第二及び第三の受信者は適宜の陸軍地區當局に通達されたい。

受領報告の事。

機密

(眞珠灣攻撃叢書第十四卷、一三二七頁)

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(25) 26 November 1941, Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a.m., this date:

1. The Japanese have been organizing a naval task force for the past month comprising:

a. Second Fleet: Under the command of Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. (The Second Fleet corresponds roughly to our Scouting Force, consisting mainly of strong Cruiser Divisions).

b. Third Fleet which formerly was the China Coast Command Force including its first and second base forces, constituted by miscellaneous small vessels.

c. Combined Air Force consisting of all large carrier forces.

d. Also destroyer squadron 3, air squadron 7, submarine squadron 5, and possibly 1 battleship division from First Fleet consisting of 3 battleships.

Summary of Above: 14 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 10 Carriers, 3 Light Cruisers. 2 Destroyer Squadrons (24 destroyers), 2 Submarine Squadrons (18 submarines), and possibly 3 battleships.

2. The combined air force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls. Present location other units of this task force are not known.

3. The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant, 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the Marshall Islands.

SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General U.S. Army  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War  
Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.  
I.B. File  
Far East Section  
Record Section

(Page 1366, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



合衆國第七十九議會第一期

直珠門攻撃調査合同委員會書證第三十三號ヨリノ拔萃  
認證第三十三號

華府、聯軍省、G.I.農作ニヨル宣傳情報判定

一九四一年十一月二十六日

四目日本海軍機動部隊

一九四一年十一月二十六日

參謀長ヘノ覺書

日本海軍機動部隊

以下ノ情報ハ、本日午前十二時四十五分、海軍情報部ヲ通ジ第十四海軍司令官ヨリ受ケ取ツタモノデアル。

一、日本海軍機動部隊ヲ過去一ヶ月ニワタリ編成シツツアツタ。  
ソノ構成次ノ如シ。

a、第二艦隊 第二艦隊司令長官ノ下ニアリ。(第二艦隊ハ主トシテ強力ナル巡洋駆逐カラ成リ、大体我ガ偵察船ニ相當スル)



二、第三艦隊リコレハ、以前ノ中日沿岸にて備候テアリ、第一、第二ノ基地部隊ヲ有シ、種々ノ小艦船カラ成ツテキル。

三、聯合空軍、全大型航空母艦ヲ含ム  
又第三艦隊逐艦隊、第七航空隊、第五潛水艦隊ヲ含ム。而シテ、三機ヨリ成リ、一機ヨリ分離セル。一機モアルモノノ如シ、  
上記概算日重巡洋艦十四隻、輕巡洋艦四隻、航空母艦十隻、輕巡洋艦三隻、駆逐艦隊二段ハ、驅逐艦二十四隻、潛水艦隊二段（潛水艦十八隻）及駆逐艦三隻（憶測）

二、聯合航空隊ハ台灣ノ高雄ニ集結シ敵隊ハ海南島ニアルモノノ如シ。  
第三艦隊ハ高雄及ビ台灣西方澎湖諸島中ノ馬公ニ向ケ日本近海ヨリ  
出動シタル模様ナリ。第二艦隊カラノ駆逐艦ハ恐ラク現在偵察ミト  
シテ南支へ向ケ航行中デアル。「マーシャル」群島ニオイテ潛水艦  
及空軍ノ強度集結アリ、ロノ標動部隊中ノ他ノ諸分隊ノ現在ノ位置  
ハ不明デアル。

上記報告ニ基ク第十四海軍司令官ノ判定ハ、南東アジア方面ニ於

テ 強力ナル部隊ガ行動ヲ準備シツツアル可能性アリ、而シテ、ソノ  
一部ハ、バラオ及ビマーシャル群島方面ヨリ出動スルヤモ計り難シ  
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シアーマン、マイルズ

合衆國海軍漁將  
參謀次長代理 G-2

邵布先 陸軍長官

參謀次長 、 、 、

情報部

核東司

記錄課

(眞珠灣攻撃) 第十四卷 一三六六頁)

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 44 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 44

COPIES OF DEFENSE PLANS

Contents

Item

1. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (1938)
2. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 1
3. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5
4. Extracts from War Department Operations Plan - Rainbow No. 5
5. Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940
6. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
7. Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
8. Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)
9. 5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department
10. Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department
11. Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5
12. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 20L-41 (Revised) - Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas
13. Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, Fourteenth Naval District

(1) EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE (1938)

SECTION I - DIRECTIVE

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE - shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans - ORANGE, all Navy Plans - ORANGE, all Joint Plans - ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

SECTION II - ASSUMPTIONS

This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be assumed that -

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.
2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.
3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

• • • • •

(Page 1423, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護団文書第千五百號 L-ノ四

アメリカ合衆國議會第七十九議會第一會期

眞珠灣攻撃共同調查委員會署證第四十四號拔萃  
簽證第四十四號

防禦計畫ノ爲シ

目次

- 一、空海軍共同基本作戰計畫、「オレンヂ」（千九百三十八年）ヨリノ抜萃
- 二、空海軍共同基本作戰計畫「レンボー」第一號ヨリノ抜萃
- 三、空海軍共同基本作戰計畫「レンボー」第五號ヨリノ抜萃
- （三見官作戦計畫「レンボー」第五號ヨリノ抜萃）
- 一千九百四十年改正布陸防禦計畫ヨリノ抜萃
- 六、布陸、共同沿岸防禦計畫
- 七、布陸、共同沿岸防禦計畫、附錄第七號
- 八、布陸、共同空軍力概算（マーチン・ペリンデヤー附註）
- 九、布陸局、千九百四十一年十一月五日、常備或行軍手帳



十、布陸局、野戰命令第壹號 潛航防禦

十一、海軍基本作戰、レンボー第五號ヨリノ抜萃  
十二、太平洋艦隊機密書第二十號ルノ四十一（改訂）  
基地及ビ作戦地域ニ於テノ結果保証。

十三、廿十四海軍々管區海軍基地防禦軍司令部作戰計畫第一號ノ四十一

〔〕 潛海軍共同基本作戰、オレンヂ（千九百三十八年）  
ヨリノ抜萃

第一節 指 令

コノ潜海軍共同基本作戰計畫「オレンヂ」ハ、皇軍計畫（オレンヂ）  
ノ凡テ、海軍計畫（オレンヂ）ノ凡テ、共同計畫（オレンヂ）ノ凡テ、  
及ヒ「オレンヂ威脅ニ必要ナル北洋ノ凡テヲ、依ツテ以テ作戦遂開ス  
ベキ事務ナス。

第二節 候 定

コノ作戰計畫ハ、アメリカ、オレンヂ間ニ起り得ル事態ニシテ軍隊ノ  
行動ヲ必要トル如何ナル蓋然的事態ニモ適用スル。蓋然的事態ノ具体

的特質ヲ豫言スルコトハ不可能デアルガ、一般的ニ見テ次ノ場合ハ備豫  
ガ出来ル。

一、オレンヂトノ開戦ニ先立ツテ或ル期間切迫シ々關係ガ横クガ、コノ期  
間中ニ、動員前ノ準備手段ヲ講スルコトガ出来ル。

二、オレンヂニヨル正式ノ宣戦布告ナキ猶米戦勦行爲ガ促進サレルデアラ  
ウ。

三、オレンヂ海軍力ニ對スルアメリカ海軍力ノ優越ハ米艦隊ヲシテソノ作  
戦ヲオアフ西方迄延長スルコトヲ許スニ足リ、第三國ガオレンヂ取ハ  
アメリカニ與ヘルガ如キ援助ハソノ如何ナルモノナルモノニモセヨ、  
米海軍力ノコノ優越ヲ實質的ニ削減スルコトハナイ。

(「眞珠湾攻撃」第十五卷千四百二十三頁)

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Adm. Harold R. Stark - Friday, January 4, 1946.

Admiral STARK. I should say we were both making overt (6158) acts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by - I have forgotten which congressional committee, I was appearing before a number of them regularly - and I stated and it will undoubtedly be in the record somewhere, that in my opinion it did not make much difference what we did; that Hitler had every reason, if he wanted to exercise it so far as international law was concerned, to go to war with us at any time but that he would choose his own time and it would be a cold-blooded decision with him as to when that time would be most effective.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an overt act against Germany in 1941 constituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; not in my opinion. We were not at war with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except the Chinese. We were endeavoring - that is, the President and Mr. Hull were, in my opinion, and I was close to them - not to precipitate a war in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but didn't it ever enter into your discussion as a member of the war council consisting of the President, the three Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff, didn't it ever enter into your discussions as to whether or not an overt act of a military nature against Germany might constitute or also constituted an overt act against the Japan- (6159) ese?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until you just asked the question.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph:

On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe; that Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia; and that the three countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Germany and Italy of September 27, 1940, upon the United States attacking Germany?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that is correct, although I believe that the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision and she would or would not, (6160) according to whether or not it would be useful to her.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the Secretary of State of that day:

The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that may be correct, sir. I think that they had us in mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it was the belief of the State Department, and possibly of the War Council, that Germany, Italy, and Japan had in mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they entered into that agreement?

Admiral STARK. I think so, at least a possibility of it. I might add that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose from that Axis set-up or Tri-Partite agreement.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one of which the Japanese in Washington, or rather, in Tokyo informed Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the Tri-Partite agreements?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as anything that has ever been acquired along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors, no progress was made towards separating the Japanese from their Axis (6161) obligations.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we didn't get to first base on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And the intercepts told you, all of the time that we were negotiating with them, that the Japanese were adhering strictly to their Axis obligations?

Admiral STARK. I believed there was one intercept showing Germany's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was not doing more, at least one.

\* \* \* \* \*

第七十九回米國議會第一會期、眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會議事錄

一九四六年一月四日、金曜日、ハロルド、R、スターク提督證言抜萃

◎スターク提督、我々は双方ともお互を對象として公然たる行爲をやつて居つたと言つてよいでしょう。（六一五八一）私はどの委員會だつたか忘れましたが、私は若干の委員會に几帳面に出席して居ましたが議會のある委員會でそのことについて尋ねられました。その時私は次の如く陳述しました。これはどこかの記錄に載つてゐることは疑ひないと思ひますが、即ち私の考へでは、我々が如何なる事をするかは大した問題ではないといふ事、又、ヒットラーは、國際法の關する限り、彼が戦争をしやうと欲するならば、何時でも我國と戰争を始める凡ゆる理由を持つてゐた事、然し彼は自らその實行の時期を選ぶであろう。また、其の最も效果的な時期は何時であるかに付いては彼は冷靜に之を決定するであらうといふ事を述べました。

◎ギアハート氏、さて、一九四一年に於ける公然たる對獨行爲は法律上、公然たる對行爲を構成したのではありますか。

◎スターク提督、いえ、私の考へでは違ひます。我々は日本と戦争してゐませんでした。日本は中國人以外の何れの國とも戦争してゐませんでした。我々は、太平洋に於ける戦争を促進しない様に努力中であります。我々といふ意味は大統領とヘル氏のことですそして私はこの二人と密接な關係にあつたのです。大統領とヘル氏はその努力をしておつたと私に考えております。

◎ギアハート氏、そうです、併し、大統領、三長官及陸軍參謀總長海軍作戰部長を以て構成されてゐた戰爭會議の一員として、ドイツに敵對する軍事的性質を帶びた公然の行動は、日本に對する公然の敵對行動を構成するかも知れないとか又構成するものであるかどうかといふ事が貴方が論議をされた時間題とけなりませんでしたか。（六一五九）

◎スターク提督、私は記憶しません。貴方が只今質問なされる迄、私はそりいふ事に氣付きませんでした。

◎ギニアハート氏、それで、「平和と戦争」中の八四頁に御注意下さい。貴方の爲め、その一節を朗讀致します。

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月二十七日、ドイツ、イタリー及び日本は重大な關係ある同盟條約を締結した。

同條約中には、日本は歐洲新秩序の確立にあたり獨伊の指導性を認め、且つ尊重する事、獨伊は大東亞新秩序の樹立にあたり日本の指導性を認め、且つ尊重する事而して三國中の一國が當時歐洲戰爭又は日華紛争に參加してない或る國から攻撃を受ける様な場合は、凡ゆる政治的、經濟的及び軍事的手段を以て相互に援助すべき事が規定してあつた。

さて右の事から米國がドイツを攻撃したる場合、日本は、一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月二十七日の獨伊との協定により、米國を攻撃する義務を有することとなつたようと思われるではありますか。

◎スターク提督、そうです。私はその通りだと思ひます。併し私は國務省が次の事實につき證言し得ると信じます。即ち日本は結局右の條項

の實行については日本自らその決定をなすであらう。而してその實行が日本にとつて有利であるか否かに依つて、右の決定をするか或はしないかを決するであらう。といふ事であります。(六一六〇)

◎ギアハート氏、それでけ、當時の國務省が明かに承認していた此の本の著者の次の結論に貴方は同意しますか。即ち、此の最後の條項は明かに直接米國を目標として居つたといふ事に。

◎スターク提督、左様、その通りだらうと思ひます。彼等は我々の事を念頭においてゐたと思ひます。

◎ギアハート氏、それではドイツ、イタリー及日本が該協定を結んだ當時、彼等は米國側の戦争的行動を考へに入れてゐたといふ事は國務省並びに、恐らく戦争會議の信念でありましたか。

◎スターク提督、そう思ひます。少くともその可能性はありました。私が附け加へたい事は、長年の間、我々の外交上の努力は、日本を樞軸機構即ち三國協定から引き離さうとするものであつた事であります。

◎ギアハート氏、さて、貴方は傍受電報をよく知つて居ましたか。

その中の一つはワシントン駐在の、否寧ろ東京の日本當局が彼等の三國協定に對して確固支持する事をベルリンに通報していましたが。

◎スターク提督、けい承知しております。

◎ギー・ア・ハート氏、傍受電報又は日本大使との論譲を通じて我々が獲得した事柄に關する限り、日本國民を樞軸側に對する義務から引離す方向には何等進歩して居らなかつたのですか。（六一六一）

◎スターク提督、そうです。我々はその事に關しては一毫にも達してなかつたのです。

◎ギー・ア・ハート氏、なるほど、そして我々が彼等と交渉してゐた時を通じて、傍受電報によつて、日本國民は嚴重にその樞軸への義務を守つていったことは貴君に判つていたのですか。

◎スターク提督、日本が忠實に支持していないといふ事實に對するドイツ側の不滿を示してゐる傍受電報が一つあつたと思ひます。少くとも一つは。

Excerpts from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. II

Page 429

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Hull's statement. . . . On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

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\* \* \*

While the modus vivendi proposal was still under consideration, I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of a clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

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\* \* \*

On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the British Ambassador.

I said the same things all during those days to many of my contacts.

REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE HONORABLE  
HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE  
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

15. Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called on me and brought up the question of his conferring with the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator. I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely stated my opinion to the minister that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of such a move.

• • • •  
Page 5383-84

43. Question: What did you do to obtain the time as asked for by Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 and 8

44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and what was said by the President and you in that discussion?

Answer: Generally speaking, our entire 8 months of conversations involved gaining time. There was no conflict between this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the Japanese in pursuance of the decision to move south, proceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military movement on a large scale.

It was obvious that the time of such attack at Japan would make would be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring circumstances. It was not within the power of this Government otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms, to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-mindedness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep always open a door to the continuation of the conversations. At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifestation of weakness which might have encouraged the Japanese to be more precipitate than they were in their action. In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time. It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the Japanese had decided to strike in their own time, unless this Government should be willing to yield abjectly to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations with the Japanese.

48. Question: Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft, one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus vivendi?

Answer: A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which was labeled "Final draft," meaning that that was the last draft that was made of that document, had been furnished the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is

impossible to tell what further revision might have been made if a decision had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi.

49. Question: Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of Britain, China, and the Netherlands?

Answer: The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the British, Chinese and Netherlands diplomatic representatives was the draft of November 24. There were only minor differences between the November 24 and the November 25 drafts.

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53. Question: Was it before or after you learned of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 238?

54. Question: Was it before or after you learned that Japan was replying to your November 26 message?

55. Question: Was it before or after you knew the contents of any part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26 message?

56. Question: Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a message to the Emperor?

84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were replying to your note of November 26?

85. Question: When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part message 902, exhibit 1, page 239?

86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?

87. Question: When did you first see the message No. 844, page 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language: "therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off."?

Answer: I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the messages referred to were seen by me.

During the period in which those messages were being received and distributed, my attention was focused on reports of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted messages relating to Japan's reply to our communications of November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and statements during those last days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese had given clear indication as to the course they would take. Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Japanese communication announcing that the Japanese would not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the Government during the previous fortnight.

Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated

Page 5386 (continued)

immediate war, they could only have referred to attack by the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been watching for days.

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ultimatum on November 20, no intimations were given us that the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same time misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us responsibility for their attack upon us.

Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.

57. Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi message?
58. Question: If so, what was said about it by the President and what did you say to the President?
59. Question: Did you ever discuss with the President the fact that you were not going to send the modus vivendi but were going to send the note of the 26th?
60. Question. If you had such a conversation or discussion with the President about that date on the modus vivendi will you give us the conversations?

Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and consulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the details of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indicated in my statement before the committee on November 19 1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to the President--and he approved-- my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan.

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Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.

79. Question: Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and America grow worse after November 27?
80. Question. If they did grow worse how do you account for no other message being given to the commanders in the field?

Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establishment could not be expected to preserve national security.

Page 5392

88. Question: Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indicate to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and therefore that war was imminent?

Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United States to Japan's demands. The intercepted Japanese message to which you refer did no more than confirm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject surrender to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26.

「真珠灣攻撃」拔萃

(米國政府印刷局、華府一九四六年)

第二卷

四二九頁

前國務長官、コードル・ヘルの證言

ヘル氏の陳述

……十一月七日定例閣議ニ出席しました。大統領の習慣として自身で討議の口を切るか或は閣員の誰かに質問を發するのを常としました。この會議では大統領は私に向ひ、何か意見があるかどうかを聞きました。そこで私は約十五分間程國際状勢の危機を指摘しました。私は日本との會談の全貌を述べ、私の意見では關係は極度に危局に面しており、日本により何時、何處に對して爲されるからしれぬ軍事的攻撃に對し警戒をなすべきであると強調しました。私が語り終へた時、大統

領は閣員の意見を徵されました。全員私の危機の予測に同意致しました。その様な局面の展開に對して米國が、よりよく準備する爲にはもし可能であるならば危機の状態を演説に於いて充分強調すべきだといふことに内閣の意見が一致しました。

× × × × × × × ×

四三四頁

暫定取扱の提案が尙考慮されてゐる間、私は日本との關係の危險性を十一月二十五日の軍事會議に於て強調しました。大統領國務長官、陸海軍長官、參謀總長、海軍作戰部長より構成せられてゐる軍事會議は夫々の接觸面と又夫々の範圍内で、その時々に論議されるあらゆる情報や意見の交換所の如きものになつて居りました。特別な時機に於ける局面の發展の最重要點は繰えず之等の會合で検討されて居りましたその會合に於ても又私は日本軍隊は既に攻撃の態勢にあるといふ私の當時抱いてゐた予測を述べました。

日本の指導者達は心を決め、死物狂ひになつてゐる。彼等は何處に、

いつなん時、何れの土地に襲ひかかるかもしだれない。私は彼等の計畫の中の奇襲の要素の確率を強調しました。私は事實上最終の段階に達せるさと及び我々の國衆的安全の保障は陸海軍の手に委ねられてゐることを感じました。

× × × × × × × ×

## 四四〇頁

十一月二十八日、軍事會議に於て私は、我々が日本に對して爲した十一月二十六日の提案を檢討し、日本と協定に到達する可能性の實際的一月二十六日の提案を檢討し、日本と協定に到達する可能性の實際的に全く無きことを指摘しました。私は私見に依れば日本はなんどき新しい侵略行爲を以て襲ひかかるかもしれないこと、そして國家に安全の保障は、陸海軍の手に委ねられてゐることを強調しました。

日本は奇襲の要素を以てその作戦の主要點となすであらうし又防禦及連絡の爲の努力を弱めんとして種々なる地點を同時的に攻撃するかもしないといふ想定の下に我々の軍事的防衛の計畫はなさるべきであるといふ私の判断を申し述べました。

十一月二十九日私は大体に於て同意見を英國大使に語りました。  
同じことをその當時を通じ多くの接觸者に語りました。

第十卷

五三七四頁

眞珠灣攻撃調査合同委員會委員ホーリー、ファーガソン氏により爲された訊問に對する返答

一五、答、一九四一年十一月九日、オーストラリヤ公使は私を訪問し、彼が日本の代表來橋氏と談合し、來橋氏にオーストリアは喜んで仲介者の勞をとらんとするものなることを示唆せんとすることについて質問をしました。私は彼がその様な手をうつことについて異議は申しませんでしたが、公使に對して外交政階は既に終りかかる策動からは何等得る所はないであらうといふ私の意見を述べるにとづきました。

五三八三一八四頁 × × × × × × × ×

四三、質問、マーシャル及スタークが十一月五日及二十七日の彼等の覺書の中で要求した時間を得る爲、あなたは如何なることを爲しましたか。

四四、

問、貴下は本問題と大統領と討議しましたか、又その討議に於て大統領と貴下は何を語りましたか。

答、一般的に云ふと我々の會談の全八ヶ月は時をかせぐことにありました。此の目的と、日本を平和政策を遂行するやうに説得しようと/or/する我々の熱心な努力との間には何等衝突はありませんでした。一九四一年七月二日の東京に於ける御前會議后日本は南進の決定に従ひ、大規模の軍事行動のため必要な準備を迅速に進めました。

日本がなさんとする攻撃の時機は日本自らの選擇により定まり日本の準備及び好都合な状勢を日本が如何に判断するかによつて定まる」と云ふことは明らかでありました。日本のやり方を抑制するは日本の條件に従ふのでなければ米國政府の存し得る處ではありませんでした。併し私は常に寛容なる精神、忍耐及び好意を以て日本人を取扱ふやうに努力致しました。私は交渉の最初から太平洋に於ける事態の平和的公平且安定せる解決を招來するための全ての手段を隅を

く探究せんとしたのであります。私は交渉の繼續のため常に門戸を開放して置くため凡ゆる努力をしました。同時に私は弱身を見せて日本の行動を更に促進することがないよう注意せねばなりませんでした。かくして我々は貴重な數ヶ月を稼ぎ得たと信じます。所が私が觀察した所によれば、十月には日本は米國政府が日本の條件に屈従しない限りその欲する時に出撃する決心をした事が明瞭になりました。私は絶えず大統領と出来るだけ時を稼ぐことにつき、討議しました。そして日本との交渉中この事は常に深く念頭に置いてゐたのであります。

四八

問、國務省は暫定取極の最後の草案即ち日本側に交付するためのものを用意しましたか

答、十一月廿五日附の暫定取極案は「最後の草案」と書かれてあります。之は此の種文書の最後の案であつたことを意味するもので、之は委員會に提出せられました。併し正確に云へば之は「日本側に交付する許りになつた」案と云ふことは出來ません、と云ふのは日本側に暫定取極案を提出することに決定された場合更に如何なる修正がなされたかは分らないからであります。

問、御話の様な案を英國支那及び和蘭の大使に見せましたか

答、英國、支那及び和蘭の外交代表に示された一番新しい案は十一月廿四日附のものであります、併し十一月廿四日の案と今廿五日の案との間にはごく些細な相異があるだけであります。

五三  
五三八五貢

問、それは貴下がバイロット電報即ち第九〇一〇號の電報（書證第一號二三八頁）を知つた前ですか、後ですか

五四

問、それは日本が貴下の十一月二十六日附書信に答へようとしてみると云ふことを知つた前ですか、後ですか

五五

問、それは十一月二十六日の貴下の書信に對する返事の十四部分の電報の何れかの部分を知つた前ですか、後ですか

五六

問、大統領又は貴下により天皇に親電を送ることに決定せられた前に電報第九〇二號（二三九頁書證第一號）の十四部分の十三部中の何れかを受け取つた事を知つてゐましたか。

八四

問　十一月二十六日の貴下のノートに對し、日本が回答しようとしてゐる事を最初に知つたのは何時ですか

八五

問　電報電九〇二號（書證第一號、二三九頁）の十四部の何れかの部分を始めて見たのは何時ですか

八六

問　通報は後に決定せらるべき時間に交付せらるる筈であると云ふ事を始めて知つたのは何時ですか

八七

問　電報八四四號（一九五頁、書證第一號）即ち電報すべき「依て兩三日中に右米案に對する帝國政府の見解申入れを以て、實質的には交渉は打切りとする他なき情勢なるが、交渉決烈の印象を與ふることを欲せず」

この言葉を含む電報を始めて見たのは何時ですか

答

御説の電報を私が見た正確な時間はつきりと思ひ出すことは出來ませ

ん。

之等の電報が受け取られ配布せられてゐる期間中私の注意は印度支那に於ける既に出発點から日本の大船隊が巡航してゐたこさにより示された非常に脅威的な行動の報告に私の注意は集中されて居りました。

之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米國側通告に対する日本側回答に門する傍受電報の脅迫的な局面よりも一層緊急且重要なものでありました。

真珠灣攻撃に先立つ最後の數時間に於ける會話及陳述を明らかにした通り私は戦争は何時勃發するかも分らない、日本はその取らんとしてゐる進路も明らかに示してゐたと感じて居りました。日本は交渉を繼續しないと云ふことを云つてゐる日本の入電を傍受して知つた事柄は私がその之に先立つ二週間内に米國政府は内の同僚に話してゐた判断を唯確かめたのに過ぎません。

六〇

問 若し貴下がその日暫定取極に付、大統領と會談し又は討議せられたると  
が有るならば、その會談を御話しください。

答 私は御えず大統領に接し暫定取組案の考慮、中緒での段階に於て充分大統  
領と相談致しました。討議の詳細を思ひ出すことは出来ませんが、職務の  
考へ方は一九四五年十一月十九日委員會に於てなした、私の陳述中に示  
されて居ります、大統領は私の表明した見解に不同意を云々された事はあ  
りません、十一月廿六日私は大統領に日本代表を招致し暫定取組案は之  
を差控えて廣範な基礎的定義を手交することを大統領に勧告しその承認  
を得ました

五三九一页

質 同七九乃至八〇は一回答に之を總括する  
同 七九

質 同七九乃至八〇は一回答に之を總括する  
同 日米間の外交關係は十一月二十七日以後悪化しましたか

八〇

同 若し悪化したのなら同故戦場に於ける司令官にもつと別の通信をしなかつたのですか

答

日米外交關係は十一月廿七日以後、一層悪くなつたと云ふことは出來ません、只我々の予想し又日本側で計畫してゐた危機が一層手近に迫つたと云ふだけであります。外交狀態に何等根本的に新しいものはなかつたのであります、我々の見る所によれば事態は特に十一月廿一日より眞珠灣攻撃に至る間に於ては日本は何時攻撃するかも知れず外交手段により國家の安全を保持することを期待し得なかつたのであります

五三九二頁

八八

同 電報八四四號へ答證第一號一九五頁一は實下の廿六日のノートは受諾せられず、従つて戰争は緊迫してゐることを實下に示しませんでしたか

答

私は既に米國が日本の要求を完全に容れない限り如何なる事にも日本は之に同意しないと云ふ事も認めて居りました、貴下の云はれる傍受日本電報は私が既に知つてゐた事を確かめに過ぎません、既に私が繰返し指摘した様に日本は我々が侵略者たる日本の要求に卑屈な降伏をなさる限り我々を攻撃しようと決心してゐたのであります。日本が十一月廿六日の米國案を受諾しようとはとても考へられないことでした。

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
 (with enclosures) - 18 September 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET  
 U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

AIR MAILPERSONALCONFIDENTIAL

Honolulu, T. H.  
 18 September 1940.



Dear Betty:

While the Secretary was on board the ENTERPRISE he said to me, "Admiral, will you come to Washington in early October while you are on the Pacific Coast?", I replied, "I can not come to Washington except under orders, but if Stark wants to see me I suppose I will be ordered."

Just before leaving Pearl Harbor the Secretary said, "Admiral, I will talk to Stark and it is possible that we may want you to come to Washington for a conference." I replied, "I will be glad to come any time I am wanted."

I do not know of any benefit to the Navy that would accrue from my coming to Washington as I fully and frankly expressed my views to the Secretary on all points where I felt that such expression might help the Navy or the Nation. I also gave him a memorandum which covered the more important points discussed with him. Nevertheless, if you or the Secretary want me to come I will be pleased to do so.

During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet and I have frequently heard officers say, "I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election."

In the Fleet we did all we could to show both Secretaries what we are, what we are doing, and what we are thinking. Regardless of whether we made a good impression on the Secretary I believe that it would have boosted our spirits a bit if, upon his departure, he had sent a dispatch to the Fleet in these waters or to Cincus expressing some appreciation of our efforts to show our wares or approbation of our endeavors to maintain an efficient Fleet. Personally I feel that the Fleet made a good impression, and that a dispatch would have been sent had the Secretary been accompanied by a competent aide.

Please tell Nimitz that his letter of 30 August regarding six-year enlistments was delivered to me by the Secretary's Aide on Monday afternoon a few minutes before the Secretary left the ENTERPRISE and after I had completed my serious talks with the Secretary.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,  
 Chief of Naval Operations,  
 Navy Department,  
 Washington, D. C.

P. S. As far as I know I have nothing to take up with the

D. D. 1500-M-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
(with enclosures) - 18 September 1940.

Department that can not be handled by correspondence but  
if I am wanted in Washington I am ready to come on arrival  
at San Pedro.

/s/ JOR

Defense Note: PS above in "handwriting."

機密件號一五〇〇一四一

J. O. RICHARDSON 大將より H. R. STARKE 大將宛電報（同封物あり）一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月十八日

合衆國海軍

合衆國海陸空三軍大將

航空便 緩急 密

ハワイ、ホノルル（一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月十八日

ペティ様

長官がエンターブライス號にお出の節「大將、太平洋岸に召られる間に十月始めにワシントンへ来てもらえますか」私に聞いたので私は「命令に依る以外はワシントンへ行く事は出来ませんが若しスタークが私に会ひたいなら私は命令を受けるだらうと思ひます」と答ました眞珠湾を出發する直前に長官は「大將、スターク氏に話して置きませう。そして會談の爲我々は貴方にワシントンへ来て頂く事にするか



も知れません」と云つたので私は「御用なら何時でも書んであります」と答へました。

海軍或は國家に対する援助になるかも知れないと思つた總ての點に關して私は充分に且つ率直に自分の意見を長官に述べて置きましたから私がワシントンへ行く事に依つて海軍に何の利益があるか分りませんまた私は彼と論じた比較的重要な諸點を網羅した覚書を彼に渡しました。それにも拘らず若し貴方が長官かが私に来てほしいなら喜んで参ります。

過去六ヶ月間に緒藤は二人の長官の訪問を受けました最近の訪問中に長官は緒藤の將兵に非常に好ましい印象を與へましたそして蔵校達が「選舉の結果如何に拘らずノック陸軍大佐が長官として留任される事を希望する」と云ふのを暫々聞いた事があります

緒藤では私達は自分達がどんな人間であるか何をしてゐるか、何を考へてあるかを兩長官に示す爲に全力を盡くしました。我々が長官に

よい印象を與へたかどうかは別として若し長官が出立際此の邊に於ける上ににゐる機  
械に或は司令長官に打電して手持品を呈せようとする我々の努力に對  
する感謝或は精銳きざなを保持する我々の努力に對する感謝を表してく  
れたらならばその事は我々の精神を少し昂揚させたであらうと信じます  
私個人としては我が艦隊は良い印象を與へたと思ひます

そして若し長官が有能な副官を從へてゐたならば電報を打つてくれたで  
あらうと思ひます

八月三日附、六ヶ年兵備監査に付するニミツツの手紙は月曜日の午  
後長官がエンターブライスを立ち去る数分前私が長官と重要な會議を  
遂げた後に長官の副官が私に届けて呉れた事をニミツツに傳へて下さ  
い

敬具

署名 J·O·リチャードソン

コロンビア地区ワシントン市海軍省、合衆國海軍、海軍作戦部長

H . R . スターリ 海軍大將

追伸 私の知つてゐる限りでは海軍省の事で手續處理出来ない事は何もありませんがワシントンへ出頭せよとの事ならサンビドロに到着の際に出かけられます

署名 ( J . O . R . )

備註  
上記追伸は肉筆

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES PERTAINING WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII  
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

- (5) 24 November 1941 from Op-12 to Mitchell et al. Subject: Warning of Surprise Aggressive Movements.

(5) Sealed Secret

Drafter: Op-12

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

Released by: Ingersoll.

Date: November 24, 1941.

Addressees

For action

CINCAF

CINCPAC

COM 11

COM 12

COM 13

COM 15

For information

SPENAVO LONDON

CINCLANT

242005 CR0443

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees to inform senior army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.  
Copy to WPD, War Dept., and to  
Op-12 but no other distribution.

(Pages 1327 - 1328 of Volume 14 "Pearl Harbor Attack" Series)



辯護文書 第一五〇・一

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會書證第三二五号ノ拔萃 合衆國

第七十九回會、第一期

書證 第三二號

陸軍省及ヒawai間ノ通信

一九四一年七月八日ヨリ九月七日迄

(5) 一九四一年十一月二十四日 海軍作戦部長ヨリキムメル等宛件名、奇

瑞 攻撃攻勢態勢ニ對スル報告

印

署名

官職

官名

年月日

HQOIIIBI

OINPAO

SPENAVD  
OROIII



日米會談ガ圓滿ニ成立スル見込ハ極メテ否シイ、コノ情勢ニ加フルニ  
日本政府聲明並ビニ日本海軍及ビ陸軍ノ移動ハ我々ノ意見デハ、フイリ  
ツビン諸島又ハグアム島ノ攻撃ヲ含ム何レノ方向ニテモ奇襲攻撃活動ノ  
オソレアル事フ示ス。參謀長ハコノ急信ヲ一讀ノ後、警意ヲ表シ各作戰  
areas 一一對シ、ソノ位置ヲ陸軍上級士官ニ報告スルヤウ要請シテキ  
ル。既ニ緊迫シタ狀態ヲ糾糾セシメナイ爲ニ又ハ日本ノ行動ニ拍車ヲカ  
ケル爲ニ極秘ガ必可デル。グアム島ニ對シテハ別ニ報告サレルデアラウ、

陸軍省 WPD 及ビ OPI 十二宛寫シ。他ニ配布セズ

(第十四卷「眞珠灣攻撃」集 第一三二七頁—一三二八頁)

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

- (27) 29 November 1941, Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.  
(Excerpt)

I.B. 159

NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:  
Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941 - said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

The President	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Secretary of War	Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.
Secretary of State	G.H.Q.
Under Secretary of War	Chief of the Air Corps
Assistant Secretary of War	Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of War for Air	Coordinator of Information
The Chief of Staff	General Embick
Chief of the Army Air Forces	Record Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	I.B. File
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	

dyA

機密資料 一五〇〇一M-三

眞珠灣攻撃共同調查委員會證據第三十三號拔萃  
第七十九國會第一議會

證據第三十三號

D、O、華盛頓陸軍省G-2作成陸軍情報觀測

(三七) 一九四一年十一月廿九日 首題

一九四一年十二月一日より一九四二年三月三十一日に至る定期的情況觀測概略(抜萃)

I、B、一五九 一九四一年十一月廿九日

參謀總長に對する覺書

首題、一九四一年十二月一日より一九四二年三月卅一日に至る

定期的情況觀測概略

蘭領東印度の政府及び人民は母國に忠實な獨立國として確かに而も建

Def. Doc. # 1500-M 5



- 設的に實際的の役目を引き續き果して居た。和爾魂の證據として彼等は  
(a) 彼等の陸軍を再組織した  
(b) 軍備必需品を盛んに製造して居る  
(c) 軍備兵の訓練を活潑に行つて居る  
(d) 金島に飛行場網を擴大した  
(e) 擴大なる防衛計畫準備につき米英政府と協力した  
(f) 日本との通商條約更新を拒否した  
(g) 日本には一九四一年一月一日以來單に油臺萬噸を供給したに過ぎなか  
つた。此油は尙を效力を爲して居る舊契約に對する供給分であつた。  
極東に於て合衆國は可能交戰國として將又支那、英領聯邦及蘭領東印度とし  
に對する軍需品の努力なる供給源として關心が持たれて居る。我々は泰  
國へ數台の軍用飛行機を送らんと患て居る。併し此方面は補給の見地から  
らすれば第二次的のものであらう。如何なる事があつても我々は臺灣、  
蘭領印度への補給が引き續き出来る様にしなくてはならぬ。又支那に對  
しては較々不安氣乍ら經由ルート經由より多分補給するであらう。兩比  
ト

利亞は萬一日本が露西亞を攻撃せば全然遮断さるゝ事とならう  
板東方面に於ける我々の 熱力は我々 の海電力と我々の經濟封鎖の努力と  
に賛同する。此二つは何よりも日本が極めて相輔として全面的參戰すること  
と阻止してある最も有力な要因である。若し我々が日本との戰争に捲  
き込まれ、事あらば我々は海軍と陸軍により日本に對し真剣な攻勢を  
とる事が出來るのである。が斯の如き攻撃は見透しのつく期間内では決  
定的のものとなり得ないし後々に勢力を分散してナチの擊破と云ふ我々  
の目的から遠ざかる事となるから主作戦的攻勢力の見地からも缺ぐる  
がある

シェルマン、マイルス

亞米利加合衆國陸軍准將  
參謀總長臨時補佐官

處

Def. Doc. # 1500-M 5

分配先

大統領

卷之四

國學長官

陸道元

陪寧長官稍佐官

卷之三

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卷之三

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情報調査  
江口作

卷之三

記錄課  
公文書讀 I · B

「楓珠灣攻擊」第十四卷  
頁一三六八一 三七三

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 49 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

SECRET

U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)  
B.U.S.(J)(41)30  
Short Title ABC-1  
March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

GENERAL

1. Staff Conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941, between a United States Staff Committee representing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and a United Kingdom Delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were associated with the United Kingdom Delegation throughout the course of these conversations, but were not present at joint meetings.

2. The personnel of the United States Staff Committee and of the United Kingdom Delegation comprise the following:

• • • • .

(Page 1487, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



- 1 -

辯護書類 一五〇〇一M-4

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據書類第四九號ヨリノ拔萃  
合衆國第七十九議會、第一期

秘

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略稱 A B C I -

一九四一年三月二十七日

米英參謀會談報告

一般

一、一九四一年一月二十九日ヨリ一九四一年三月二十七日迄ワシン  
トンニ於テ海軍作戰部長並ニ陸軍參謀總長ヲ代表セル合衆國參  
謀委員ト各參謀總長ヲ代表スル英帝國代表團トノ間ニ參謀會談  
行ハレタリ。カナダ、豪洲、並ニニュージーランド自治領ノ參



謀長代表者ハ是等ノ會談期間中、英帝國代表國ト連絡シ共同シ  
居リタルモ、共同會談ニハ出席セザリキ。  
二、合衆國參謀委員並ニ英帝國代表國ノ人員顧觸レハ以下ノ如シ

(真珠灣攻撃一第十五部一四八七頁一

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from the testimony of Joseph C. Grew - Tuesday, November 27, 1945.

\* \* \* \* \*

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12 o'clock. Before recessing the Chair would like, if the committee is willing, inasmuch as paragraphs have been read from Mr. Grew's letter to the President, of December 14, and the President's reply of January 21, the Chair will ask that the full text of both those letters be printed in the transcript of the record at this point.

(The letters referred to follow.)

DEAR FRANK: \* \* \*

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "new structure" is an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

\* \* \*

(Pages 630 - 632, Part 2 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



合衆國第七九議會第一期

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會議事錄

一九四五年十一月二十七日火曜日ジオセフ、シー、グルー證言拔萃

議長「唯今十二時であります。休憩に入るに先立ち議長は委員會が同意せられるならば十二月十四日附大統領宛グルー氏書翰及び一月二十一日附大統領復信は既にその若干を朗讀せられたのでありますから、茲に兩書翰の全文を印刷し記録の寫しのうちに採錄せられることを望みます。

（右言及せられたる書翰次の如し）

フランク君

簡単に謂つて、私は現在及び將來の事に就いて大体そんな風に見てゐる貴下は私がこの位地にあつて正確な情報を摑むに奔走し一と云ふのは今日本人自身左手がしてゐることを右手は知らぬ有様なのだが一へまあ一やれるだけは明確に情況を描き出そうとした私の電報の幾らかを見て居



られるに違ひないと思ふ。彼等の所謂「新体制」なるものはひどくとりとめのないもので政府自身の内部で行はれて居る口論争論沙汰は全く想像の外だ。全体主義的な新施策は一つ一つ尤もらしい標語にかざられてゐる。今の日本は我々が知つて居り且つ愛して居つた日本とは全く別物だ。

(眞珠灣攻撃第二部六三〇頁—六三二頁)

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship  
At Sea,  
12 September, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

1. The following notes are submitted on the points which we discussed in my effort to meet your wishes to know officers, learn about ships and find out how you could assist the Fleet's preparation for war.

2. PERSONNEL

(A) Officers.

- (a) Promotion by selection best method yet devised.
- (b) Members should be allowed to serve on two successive boards if circumstances render it advisable (requires change by Congress).
- (c) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; the most promising officers should be given preference. This would tend to create a division of officers into two classes, the most promising and the least promising, or an A and B list.
- (d) The abuses of retirement for physical disability and the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of the physically unfit should be corrected.

(B) Enlisted Personnel.

- (a) While the enlisted strength increased 11,349 between 23 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expenditures for material may prove futile unless there is a prompt and commensurate personnel expansion.
- (b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the rate of acceptance of new men, should be eliminated at once and emergency expansion should begin now without awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not waited for specific appropriations in providing material expansion, and it is difficult to understand or explain to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet even more vital problems of personnel (involving the imperative necessity of making ready what we already have as well as training men for new construction) with equally direct and effective action. I estimate the time necessary to make a modern man-of-war's-man at 4 years. You can see the necessity of getting started on this training right away.

(C) Separate Air Corps.

- (a) Unquestionably a higher degree of cooperation will exist between our Naval air arm and other Naval arms if all of them continue to be intimately bound together in one Navy.

(b) With a separate air corps there is bound to develop a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy, many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, administration, and above all a serious loss in effectiveness.

(c) I know of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that would accrue from the creation of a Naval Air Corps.

### 3. MATERIAL

#### (A) Surface ships.

(a) I believe new construction is being expedited as much as possible. Minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast.

#### (B) Aircraft.

(a) A tremendous expansion in this field complicated by foreign orders as well as by our demands. Airplanes, either for sale or for training, should not be obtained at the expense of the active Fleet. Fleet planes must be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes, but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are on hand.

#### (C) Ammunition.

(a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of anti-aircraft ammunition.

### 4. OPERATIONS

#### (A) Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

(a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:

- (1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
- (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
- (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.
- (4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.
- (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing.
- (6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.
- (7) In case of war, necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measures resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

- (b) If the disposition of the Fleet were determined solely by Naval considerations the major portion of the Fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.
- (c) If factors other than purely Naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the Fleet should be based at this time, the Naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?
- (d) In case our relations with another Pacific Nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the Fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 2000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases?

#### 5. SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

- (a) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the position and purpose of the Shore Establishment over-emphasized. It has only one purpose - the support, maintenance and augmentation of the fighting Fleet. It cannot, of itself, damage an enemy. It is only human that some of those in Washington and long removed from the active Fleet, (predominantly staff corps) frequently fail to visualize the correct priority of objectives.

#### 6. NAVY PUBLICITY

Practically all Navy Publicity, hearings before committees, speeches in Congress and handouts from the Navy Department have stressed one or more of the following ideas:

- (a) The Navy is built for defense.
- (b) A so-called adequate Navy will keep us out of war.
- (c) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Nations of the earth with little danger of becoming involved in war.
- (d) In the unhappy event of war the Fleet is a kind of mobile Maginot Line behind which the people can reside in peace with no obligation to their Country except to promise that their descendants will some day pay for the Navy.

- (e) The Fleet is fully manned, fully trained and ready to fight at the drop of a hat.
- (f) The comparative strength of navies is measured solely by material things.
- (g) Aviation is a cheap means of defense and that large numbers of planes and pilots will render the nation secure.
- (h) Outlying Naval bases and air fields, in themselves are weapons of defense.

The type of publicity mentioned above is wrong in that it tends to lull the public into a false sense of security. It tends to weaken their moral fibre and to create an unhealthy national morale in a country which may be drawn into war on very short notice. For a people, who may actually be involved in war in a comparatively short time, to be told that they can risk war without danger or wage war without risk, may be fatally detrimental to the determined prosecution of the very war towards which such conceptions inevitably lead. At the beginning of the present war, the French and British had just these ideas, with the present result,

#### 7. COOPERATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE, STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.

(a) Whether justified or not, I can not escape the feeling that the coordination and mutual understanding between the above departments of the government is not as close as is necessary for effective action.

(b) Before reaching a decision as to the disposition and movements of the Fleet, or units thereof, is the Navy Department consulted, are its views frankly and forcibly presented, and are its representations thoroughly understood and considered?

(c) Present policy appears to be headed towards forcing our will upon another Pacific Nation by diplomatic representations supported by economic measures, a large material Navy in process of construction, and the disposition of an inadequately manned Fleet in being. Can this be done and are we prepared to face war or the inevitable loss of prestige if it cannot? Have the objectives of such a war been formulated, and its costs considered and compared with the value of victory? Can such a war be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe that the Navy is for defensive purposes only, and that their whole obligation to their country can be met by the payment of taxes.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief has no responsibility for the formulation of National policy, but he has a definite responsibility for the efficiency of one arm upon which the government relies to enforce National policy, when its aims can not be secured by diplomatic means. He must be concerned over the question as to whether the strength and efficiency of the Fleet are commensurate with the aggressive policy of the administration in the Pacific. Especially so if there is a possibility that this policy will require implementation.

(e) Are objectives being formulated and plans made for our active participation in the European war? We cannot long remain half in and half out of such a war. We should decide now on definite objectives and plans and should not assume that we will fight this one like we did the last, i.e., by sending aviation and light forces for active participation and utilizing our heavy ships, in secure home bases, largely as training ships. Such a course would immobilize our heavy ships, which are most certainly going to be needed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, depending on the progress of the war.

/s/ J. O. Richardson

doc /500-N-1

司令長官書類  
番号  
重米利加合衆國艦隊

重米利加合衆國軍艦旗艦  
二タフライ入号

海上上於

海軍大臣為、演習旨

以下、演習、士官就任チラートシ又艦船就任学バト艦隊軍事

準備援助得方係見セテスに貴下、希望副ハト努力ニ吾人  
會議論及諸異聞提サセタモテアヒ。

## 人員

### 正將校

- (1) 技能昇進が從未考査サクナ最良、方法  
來演ハラ情ニテ適當十時、連續的航海勤務許可  
サルベキコト(議會ヨリ度更入シ要トス)
- (2) 海上勤務指定の能力ヲ基礎トベキコト最も有望ナ士官  
候選權附與サルベキコトコ、結果將校最も有望及最劣等  
即ナA表及B表、二種、介コトニテアリ。

身体的不能因退役、證用及身体的不適格者現役勤  
務持續久ジ退役達成ハ是正サルベキコト

### 兵員

- (1) 兵員兵力五月十三日ヨリ八月十五日間於一三四九名増員  
サルハ太平洋於ル艦隊八僅リ二六。、定益、獲ト過キ又  
我が方資材計入巨額費用ハ迅速且飼合トシ人負擔  
張リ才不限其益トスアロウ

- (2) 訓練所、陸路、新兵受入率制限スカラ即刻除去セ  
ハナラズ、然ニテ終急擴張不足額補充金付

161



Defense Doc. 15-007N-1

No. 2

「コナリ 六角 伸也トアス 五人 = 暫時、拡張準備ニ隊シ 特定、経費ヲ付タカラム 何故、吾人ハ一層緊要トモイバ人員ノ問題ニ吾人、有ルモノヲ準備スルコト及三新構成ニ計シ人員ヲ訓練スルコト、終念心心要ヲ含ミ等シ、直待且有効ナル行動ヲ以テ対処スルコトが出来ベ又之ヲ為サントナリカ、理由ヲ艦隊ニ諒解セシム又ハ説明スルコトハ困難テアシ。余ハ新式軍艦、要員ヲ任シル所定期間ヲ四年間ト推算スル。實下ハシ、訓練ヲ即時開始スル、必要ヲ諒解シ未ヨウ。

### 六 分離セル航空部隊

- (1) 若し總ベテ、海軍部隊が一作、海軍トシテ密接ニ結果を繼續シテ行ナラバ我が海軍航空部隊ト他、海軍部隊、向ハヨリ高度、協力が存在スルヲアリテノ段フニテモ、(2) 航空部隊ヲ分離シテ置クト、海軍ニ對シテヨリもムシロ部隊ニ心動ラ屬マウストス様十気運運ヤ、部隊ト他、海軍上、同、候若十補給、人員、管理ニ渉入山西倒十多く問題、就中、能率ニ、重大十損失が生ズルキア、アリ。(3) 海軍航空部隊ヲ創設スルコトカラ、海軍又ハ國家ニ何、利益モ齎スモノアナイト云々ヲ余未ツテキル

### 三 素材

#### ① 水上艦船

- (1) 新建造ハ未シテア候准サレキルト余、信シテ事。
- (2) 水雷敷設艦が大西洋岸ニ必要テアル。

#### ② 航空機

(1) 外國（註文並）我が國、需要上に依りて種々化して此、  
分野。於ル大擴張、貿易用又訓練用航空機、  
敵と現役艦隊、機性は得ルベキモノナリ。  
艦隊機、主未ハタ早ノ材シ機上取替ヘラシネバ  
ラス。然ニ古イ飛行機ハ新シキ半牛二入ル迄離入  
ラムニ主未ヌ。

### 六) 航空

#### 四) 作戦

- (1) (1) ハシ水域=艦隊ヲ留メルコト  
純然たる海軍的見地カラミレバ此、水域=艦隊ヲ留メテ  
オクコトハ多ク、不利益ガアル、數年ハ即チ  
(一) 人資、軍需品、及シ補給品、運搬=困難満止、及貨  
用、寄合コト。
- (2) 安全度ニ久附ガアル為、ハヤク作戦役場地トニ  
不適當ナルコト
- (3) 大艦、入港、碇泊、出港、困難ガアル為、眞珠湾が作戦役  
場地トニ不適當ナルコト
- (4) 室中、水面共=作戦区域が混雜し且制限サルナルコト
- (5) 艦隊勤務、訓練、保養、及シ收容等=対し施設不  
充分ナルコト
- (6) 將校兵員が平時=本國カラ長、離テヰタ為道徳、  
悪影響有ルコト
- (7) 戰争、除艦隊が西海岸、動員港ニ居、又ハ即今約

編制サリテナ動員指揮ヲ受ケル必要ナリハ況  
古ト時間、純損失ヲ招ク結果ナリト

(四) 若シ艦隊、處理が海軍上手方應ニヨリ、決定ナ  
ヒテラバ、艦隊、大部份、實、太平洋岸、正常基地帰心  
キアリ、何ト上心其處ヲ根據トスレバ、訓練ニ示戰爭  
討入準備ニモ便宣アシカラヤル。

(五) 若シ純然ノ海軍的要因以外、要因が現在、艦隊  
が何處ヲ根據地トスベキカトイコトニ關スル在決定ニ影響  
及ぶモノアリバ、海軍的要因煙ニ、決定の艦隊、  
即應準備ニ及ぶコトアビキ影響省ム心、提高サヒ慎重  
考究セラルベキアリ。換言スルハ、艦隊、大部份ヲ太平洋  
岸、正常基地、根據サセテ、何ナル水域、於ケル戰闘ニ計  
シテ、準備が容易ニシムヒヤウニスルコトヨリモ、ハリ、水域  
ニ艦隊ヲ根據サセコトヨリ太平洋ニ於ケル外交陣ニ強  
ク、且ハトスセコト、方ガ一層大切ト、テアラカ

(六) 若シ太平洋岸、他、國家上我が國ト、關係が惡化スルベ  
國務省ハ、我々、次、動キハ何アリト考ヘル  
國務省ハ、艦隊を直ニ動員サシ且艦隊ハ、ソラ直接  
ニ戰闘ヲ開始得トリ或ハ、我々、太平洋岸、正常基地ヨリ  
モ敵、灣水艦基地、二千里近イハ、ハリ、於ケル不安全  
ナ鎗セリ、必至、訓練ヲ安全ニ行コトか未ルト信ム  
ハラカ

## 五 海岸施設

(1) 余の海岸施設、古の地位或目的の餘、強調する事は、本件  
責下が断つて置かれていたる事也。しかし唯一の目的、有する居  
る過誤す、即ち戰闘艦隊支援、維持及擴充す也。其其  
自身、力で敵破砕出来ぬ事等、アリント。専ら現役艦隊  
(特參謀部隊) が以前離れたる事等の目的物、何より先  
づべきを認識し損ない、人間の方針方略にて下す。

## 六 海軍公表

實際所從之海軍公表即參照會於審議議會  
於演說及海軍省之發表文書次觀念中、或  
以以上強調主張居也。

- (1) 海軍防禦、為設立井也。
- (2) 所謂外洋海軍、或之戰爭、實情、係之甚也。
- (3) 今之海軍、往々戦争、戰爭、危険、餘、甚也。  
地球上國家、我、實志、神、心、出來也。
- (4) 不幸、之、戰爭、起、艦隊、一種、可動性、アリ、一様  
様也。後方、於、國民、自信等、ノ、殊如日本海軍、  
補償、アリ、約束、アリ、テ、外國、許、ハ、何等  
義務、アリ、甚、甚暮、アリ、出来也。
- (5) 艦隊、完全、充員、充份訓練、即、實、戰、用、意、出来  
居也。
- (6) (一) 海軍、比較的、實力、唯、全、物質的、物、依、言、アリ  
航空、空、價、防衛手段、アリ、多數、飛行機、標識、立、  
航

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## 國家安全十二大

(今) 進階、海軍基地及航行物：→ 自身防禦武器等  
 前記，宣傳森林國民，爭取心安全感，擔心恐懼下決策，間違  
 三半心，非常短促，告不戰爭，令人不知國於  
 國家精神的素質，不使全國民主著作，易以致誤的  
 短時間，實際戰爭，將未知，國民取，危險  
 +，戰爭勝敗，出未卜，危險，戰爭行，  
 トが出来，教會，斯派概念必然的導入，戰爭成為  
 運行，致命的害，从本不，現戰爭，初，佛蘭西人及英  
 國人，印度，老，特，現在，如結果，未，  
 居

## 七、行政、國務、陸軍、海軍各省間協力

(1) 正當，否，別，和，政府各省間，共動，相互了解。  
 攻擊的活動，必要工程，密接，標，備，  
 (2) 應該若，部隊，配置，行動，決定，至，前，  
 海軍省，相當，受，意，日本，中國，力，明  
 +，主張，充分了解，考慮，  
 (3) 現在政策，經濟的手段，建設，實質的大海軍，及，  
 不充現存艦隊，配置，依，支持，外交的意義，  
 依，我方，意，他，太平洋，強，上，方向，同，  
 展，得，之，為，若，成功，其，場合，  
 於，戰事，必然的，威信，依，直面化用，意，  
 斯。戰爭，目的，公私，其，屬，一，犧牲，考慮，半居